April 1-28

Newsletter to Congress:

Top Five:

1. Shin Bet Leak & Qatargate: A senior Shin Bet official leaked classified documents to Minister Chikli, sparking political turmoil. The Shin Bet Chief claims Netanyahu pressured him to target protesters and bypass legal oversight, deepening rifts with the government.

2. Dismissal Struggles: Despite a Supreme Court freeze on Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar's dismissal, top coalition members defy the ruling. Meanwhile, Justice Minister Levin seeks to remove the Attorney General but faces internal resistance and procedural delays.

3. Opposition Weakness: Despite public disapproval, the government stays intact. In light of damaging polls the coalition parties fear elections would hurt them politically, granting Netanyahu's bloc a fragile but stable majority.

4. The Rafah Incident: The IDF disciplined two officers for a strike that killed aid workers in Rafah. No evidence of foul play was found, reinforcing Israel’s claims of accountability and rapid response in wartime mistakes near Hamas targets.

5. Gaza War Status: A month into renewed fighting, the IDF has made tactical gains but lacks a clear strategic path. With Gaza split and Rafah encircled, critics say military pressure isn’t advancing negotiations or the return of hostages, and thousands of reservists issues public calls to end the war.

Security Scandals (Qatargate, the Shin Bet Leak)

A senior Shin Bet official leaked classified documents related to a Shin Bet investigation into the infiltration of Kahanist elements into the police. He passed them to Minister for Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli, who then gave them to pro-government journalist Amit Segal. The leaker was arrested on suspicion of leaking classified information.

Coalition members claim blatant political interference by the Shin Bet Chief, even though the investigation was approved by the Prime Minister. Government supporters argue the leaker is a whistleblower, and Minister Chikli has requested that he be legally recognized as such.

Regarding his attempted removal, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar wrote in a sworn affidavit to the court that Netanyahu asked him to use Shin Bet tools against protest activists. According to Bar, Netanyahu made these requests while asking the military secretary and stenographer to leave the room to prevent documentation. Bar also stated that Netanyahu told him that in the event of a constitutional crisis, Bar should obey the Prime Minister and not the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, Netanyahu allegedly tried to pressure Bar into issuing a legal opinion that would prevent Netanyahu from testifying in court on security grounds. Bar also claimed he was surprised to learn of his removal from the hostages' negotiation team and that the campaign of incitement against him is related to the ongoing investigations and an institutional effort to spread conspiracies targeting him. Such claims only intensify the drift between Bar and the government, who seeks his removal (see next article).

Regarding the Netanyahu trial, the main testimony resumed after the Passover recess but was interrupted several times due to the Prime Minister’s health-related constraints. In the Qatargate investigation, one of the main suspects, Yonatan Urich, was released to house arrest but is expected to be indicted for obstruction of justice.

Dismissal of the Shin Bet Chief and Attorney General

Following a Supreme Court order, the dismissal of Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar has been frozen. Additionally, both the Prime Minister and the Shin Bet Chief have been granted the opportunity to submit affidavits to the court clarifying their positions. Despite this, and although the Prime Minister claims he will comply with the court’s order, several coalition Knesset members and government ministers - such as Finance Minister Smotrich - have called to ignore the Supreme Court ruling. They are even boycotting the Shin Bet Chief and refusing to work with him or attend meetings in which he is present. At the moment, it seems that the chances of a compromise between the government and the Shin Bet Chief are very slim, even though Bar declared he’ll leave office by June 15.

At the same time, Justice Minister Levin wanted to initiate proceedings to dismiss the Attorney General after the Passover holiday. However, due to internal struggles within the coalition, he has failed to select a candidate to serve as the Knesset’s representative on the committee that will address the Attorney General’s dismissal. One way or another, the public discourse around the Shin Bet leak and the power struggle between the Shin Bet and the government has shifted the latter’s focus to the Shin Bet.

A pro-democracy protest outside the Knesset.

Weakness of the Opposition

In the polls we share in this newsletter, we present a trend that’s lasted since the war began - Netanyahu and his government would fail to achieve a majority in the Knesset should elections take place. However, despite being so unpopular, the government remains stable.

At first glance, it may seem surprising that the current Israeli government remains in power despite lacking broad public support. However, public disapproval does not automatically translate into a government’s collapse - especially when the political incentives of coalition members lead them to “hold the line.”

Let’s begin with a key electoral fact: Had the Meretz party - perhaps the most emblematic Zionist left-wing party - not failed to pass the electoral threshold, the current government would have secured only 61 seats in the Knesset. But because Meretz did not cross the threshold, the coalition won 64 seats - just enough for a stable majority - and added four more seats as MK Gideon Sa’ar, who left the Likud in 2020 and vowed to oust Netanyahu, rejoined the coalition as the Foreign Minister, in a move that drew harsh criticism.

In Israel, governments are rarely brought down by the opposition. Rather, they typically fall apart from within - when key players inside the coalition see an advantage in triggering elections. Today, no such player exists, and this is why elections are not in sight: most coalition members now understand that new elections would likely result in a worse outcome for them politically.

Hence each party in the coalition, for its own reasons, knows that dissolving the government now would be politically damaging. This was true before October 7, and it is even more true in its aftermath

The Ambulance Incident in Rafah

On April 20, the IDF discharged an officer and punished another for their role in the tragic Rafah incident that killed medical workers in late March. That is even though that during the investigation, no evidence of malicious activity was found: the IDF forces were at the scene for only four minutes, so they did not have time to execute or bury the bodies of the aid workers they accidentally killed, as they were engaged in fighting against Hamas combatants.

This is yet another proof that Israel, which fights to defend itself - nothing more, nothing less - is conducting thorough investigations and holding people accountable for mistakes to ensure such incidents do not happen again.

The War - Major Developments in April

A month into the resumed fighting, many Israelis are questioning what should happen for this war to end, and thousands of reservists from dozens of IDF units issued open letters calling the government’s bluff, declaring that this war is led by political motives, and arguing that the fighting does not help return the hostages or dismantle Hamas.

In Operation “Might and Sword,” which began on March 18, the IDF focused on retaking key territories while selectively engaging Hamas fighters: first, it retook control of the Netzarim corridor, successfully splitting the Gaza Strip into northern and southern regions.

On April 2, the IDF pushed into the Morag Corridor between Rafah and Khan Younis.

As of April 7, Rafah was nearly completely surrounded, and the IDF ordered civilian evacuations to minimize casualties.

In the northern area of the Gaza Strip, starting March 18, the IDF renewed airstrikes and ground assaults in the Jabalia refugee camp and issued evacuation orders for Beit Hanoun and the surrounding neighborhoods, effectively expanding the security zone around Gaza City.

By controlling major areas of Gaza by mid-April, the IDF further eroded Hamas’ military assets and impeded their regrouping and resupply efforts. However, it seems that strategically, this operation fails to leverage territory or military pressure as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, which is the declared policy of the government.

Israel’s Defense Minister, Israel Katz, stated in early April that the IDF would “seize large areas” of Gaza and annex them into Israeli “security zones,” hinting at maintaining a long-term presence until Hamas is decisively defeated. This indicates that Israel will use those “security zones” not only to negotiate for hostages but also as leverage for future security arrangements in the region.

Although the tactical achievements are noticeable - even though four IDF soldiers were killed in combat - it’s not clear if they’ll promote or hinder another ceasefire or bring Israel closer to its strategic objective.