Five Outcomes, Five Coalitions, Five Israels: What the 2026 Election Could Mean
- 4 days ago
- 6 min read
As Israel heads toward what may be the most consequential election in its history, much of the discussion has focused on one question: will Benjamin Netanyahu remain prime minister?
That is the wrong question. Or at least, not the most important one.
Israel's elections are not presidential. Israelis vote for parties, not prime ministers, and the real drama begins only after the ballots are counted. Coalition negotiations - not election night - will determine Israel's next government.
The next coalition will shape not only Israel's domestic future, but also the trajectory of the Middle East and the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship. While the exact composition remains impossible to predict, five plausible governing coalitions have emerged. Each represents a fundamentally different vision for Israel.
Scenario 1: Netanyahu, the Far Right, and the Ultra-Orthodox
This is essentially a continuation of Israel's current governing coalition. Domestically, this would mean continued efforts to weaken judicial independence, preserve broad exemptions from military service for the ultra-Orthodox, and deepen the influence of religious and nationalist parties over public life and public policy. The political polarization that has defined recent years would likely intensify, as government supporters celebrate the renewed mandate they received from voters, seeing it as validation of their policies, while government opponents would have to recalculate their strategy.
Regionally, Israel would probably continue expanding settlements, turn a blind eye to nationalist violence, reject any meaningful initiative with the Palestinians, and maintain an increasingly confrontational posture toward Israel's enemies. While normalization with additional Arab states would remain a strategic objective, achieving it without progress on the Palestinian issue would become increasingly difficult.
For U.S.-Israel relations, this is perhaps the most consequential scenario. Relations with the current Republican Party would likely remain strong yet fragile, as we are already seeing growing criticism from the MAGA wing. Meanwhile, Israel's standing among Democrats - particularly younger and progressive Americans - would continue to collapse. The re-election of this government would send a message to many Democrats that Israelis stand behind the anti-liberal values and policies it represents, thus accelerating the alienation trend that LIBRAEL has warned about for years.
This would resemble the 2021 "Government of Change": a broad coalition united primarily by a shared commitment to ending Netanyahu's rule, but also by a "technocratic" vision of repairing and healing the country, replacing hardline ideologues with professional managers.
Domestically, such a government would likely prioritize stability over sweeping reforms and focus on "bread-and-butter" issues such as the economy, education, and public safety, alongside weakening the ultra-Orthodox establishment - primarily through legislating a universal military service law - and pursuing accountability efforts by establishing a State Commission of Inquiry into the October 7 failures. The inclusion of an Arab party would once again signal that Arab citizens can and should play a legitimate role in governing Israel, and that Israeli Arabs are embracing their identity as an equal-rights minority in a Jewish-democratic state.
Regionally, expectations for a dramatic peace breakthrough should remain modest. The coalition would include mostly hawkish factions, especially Bennett and Lieberman, making major diplomatic initiatives unlikely. However, it would probably pursue confidence-building measures in the West Bank and Gaza, including seriously addressing nationalist violence, while deepening the regional partnerships established through the Abraham Accords.
For U.S.-Israel relations, this coalition would likely enjoy broad support across much of the American political spectrum. Democratic leaders would welcome a government perceived as more committed to liberal values, although optics alone would not be enough, and policy adjustments would still be necessary. Disagreements over settlements and the Palestinians would remain, but with effective diplomacy and respectful dialogue, the overall tone of the relationship would improve significantly.
Scenario 3: Eisenkot, Bennett, Lieberman, and the Democrats - Without Arab Parties
This coalition would resemble Scenario 2 but without relying on Arab parties for either coalition membership or outside support.
Domestically, it would likely be more cohesive on security matters and more politically stable, but less representative of Israel's diverse society, while weakening the integration of Israeli Arabs into national politics. The absence of Arab parties could reduce attacks from the right regarding the government's legitimacy, but it would also reinforce the troubling precedent that Arab political participation is still perceived as a liability rather than an integral part of Israeli democracy.
Regionally, policy would probably remain pragmatic rather than transformative. Security cooperation with Arab partners would continue, and limited steps to improve Palestinian living conditions might advance, but comprehensive diplomatic initiatives would remain unlikely.
For U.S.-Israel relations, Washington would likely view such a government positively, though progressive Democrats may criticize the continued exclusion of Arab political representation, especially if coalition leaders vocally oppose integrating Arab parties into government. Nevertheless, compared with the current government, tensions with Democratic administrations and lawmakers would likely decline considerably.
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Scenario 4: A National Unity Government
An alliance between Eisenkot, Netanyahu, Lieberman, and Bennett would represent the broadest coalition in Israeli politics. However, it currently appears nearly impossible, given Netanyahu's absolute reliance on the ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties to secure judicial immunity, while Eisenkot, Lieberman, and Bennett have repeatedly declared that they would not sit with Netanyahu for even a minute.
Domestically, this government could theoretically stabilize Israel or at least postpone its underlying political conflicts, but it would most likely become yet another stalemate government. It could facilitate long-overdue reforms on military service, constitutional arrangements, and economic policy by bringing together parties with broad public support. However, given the rivers of bad blood between the parties' leaders, deep personal and ideological rivalries could produce paralysis rather than effective governance.
Regionally, such a government would likely project stability and military strength while avoiding dramatic diplomatic initiatives. It would probably focus on Iran and regional security cooperation rather than resolving the Palestinian conflict, as even the coalition's most left-leaning figure, Yair Lapid (who merged into Bennett's party), is not a genuine dove. On the other hand, removing ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir from the government would likely lead to more restrained and less provocative policies in the West Bank.
For U.S.-Israel relations, a unity government would likely be welcomed in Washington as a sign of political stability after years of domestic chaos. However, much would depend on Netanyahu's role. If he remained prime minister - which there is little chance he would not demand - many of the personal and political tensions with Democratic leaders would likely persist despite the coalition's broader composition.
Scenario 5: A "Unity" Government That Isn't
Perhaps the most deceptive possibility is a government that looks broader than the current coalition but changes very little.
In this scenario, Netanyahu would retain his alliance with the far right and ultra-Orthodox while adding a centrist party - such as Benny Gantz's party or the Reservists - to provide political cover and international legitimacy.
Domestically, such a coalition might appear more moderate without fundamentally altering policy. The Reservists would demand little beyond revoking the military exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox, while Gantz offers nothing more substantial than "unity." Their presence could soften the government's rhetoric and influence decisions at the margins, but the governing majority would still depend on the same ideological bloc that has shaped Israeli policy in recent years.
Regionally, foreign governments might initially hope that the inclusion of centrists signals greater flexibility. But given Netanyahu's dominance on national security issues, along with the hawkish approaches of both Gantz and the Reservists, those expectations would probably not be fulfilled, and the additional party would merely serve as political decoration.
For U.S.-Israel relations, if it said the right things, this coalition could temporarily ease diplomatic pressure, particularly if the more moderate forces were given an official role in national security affairs. But if substantive policies remained the same - and they probably would - such goodwill would likely prove short-lived. American policymakers are increasingly judging Israeli governments by their actions rather than by the labels attached to their coalitions.
The Coalition Matters More Than the Winner
Let us be clear: the identity of Israel's next prime minister will matter. But the composition of the coalition behind that prime minister will determine whether Israel moves toward greater democratic resilience or continued polarization; whether it strengthens or strains its regional partnerships; and whether it rebuilds support in the United States or accelerates its collapse.
The 2026 election will not answer every question about Israel's future. But the coalition that emerges afterward may answer the most important one: What kind of Israel will emerge from this defining chapter in its history?