The October 7 Paradox: How the War Could Help Netanyahu Win
(written by Rotem Oreg-Kalisky, founder and director of LIBRAEL; all views are his own)
Yesterday marked the third anniversary of October 7, and it was dedicated to grief and remembrance. But with the Israeli elections less than three weeks away, we must have this uncomfortable discussion about the political implications of that horrible day.
For many Israelis, October 7 is the clearest possible indictment of Benjamin Netanyahu.
A government that had made “security” its defining promise failed catastrophically to protect its citizens. The warning signs were there. The intelligence failed. The military failed. The “contain Hamas” policy, long led by Netanyahu and his governments, failed.
And Netanyahu, who had spent years presenting himself as the politician uniquely qualified to keep Israel safe, was at the top of the system when the greatest security disaster in Israel’s history occurred.
For many voters, that is enough. They do not need another argument. October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch, and he should pay the political price. This includes the millions who opposed Netanyahu to begin with, as well as other Netanyahu-disappointed voters, such as news anchor Shai Golden and Einav Tzengauker, the mother of released hostage Matan. Both had declared themselves Netanyahu supporters, but October 7 “opened their eyes” and got them to cross the partisan line, even if they still view themselves as right-wingers.
In his lowest moments, the Likud fell to 12 Knesset seats in the polls. Maybe they are buying into conspiracies about betrayal by the security establishment. Maybe they place responsibility on the protesters who “dismantled the military” by declaring they would not serve if the judicial overhaul went forward.
And just as many voters blame Netanyahu for October 7, many more do not hold him accountable. We’ll put aside for a moment the ultra-Orthodox, who overwhelmingly are not interested in national security affairs (perhaps due to their universal military service waiver), and some segments of Religious Zionism, who see October 7 and the following war as an opportunity to pursue their settlement ambitions.
In his lowest moments, weeks after the October 7 massacre, the Likud fell to 12 Knesset seats in the polls. That’s roughly 10% of the electorate who believed, and probably still do, that this is not his fault. Maybe they are buying into conspiracies about betrayal by the security establishment. Maybe they place responsibility on the protesters who “dismantled the military” by declaring they would not serve if the judicial overhaul went forward. And maybe they simply believe Netanyahu when he says that “if the military had woken me in the night before, everything would have been different.”
But those voters are probably not enough. And between these two blocks, October 7 presents Netanyahu with a counterintuitive political opportunity.
October 7 and the Gaza war: Not Necessarily the Same Story
There is a natural tendency to treat October 7 and the war that followed as one continuous political narrative: Israel failed to prevent the massacre, therefore the government failed, therefore voters should replace it.
But not every Israeli sees it that way.
For some voters, the more important question is not “How did October 7 happen?” because they recognize that the entire political and security establishment was held by the same conception, but rather “What did Israel do afterward?”
Those are very different questions, and they can produce very different political conclusions.
A voter can believe that Netanyahu bears responsibility for the failures that made October 7 possible and still believe that, once the war began, he was right to insist on fighting Hamas despite pressure - both internal, from Israelis who emphasized bringing back the hostages as the top priority, and external, from Israel’s allies, especially the Biden administration, which opposed a prolonged war.
This argument becomes more convincing when considering the opposition - internal and external - to expanding the war into Hezbollah and Iran, given Israel’s relative achievements in those theaters (although, as in Gaza, far from Netanyahu’s promised “total victory”).
This is particularly important among voters who might otherwise have reasons to abandon Netanyahu. Some right-wing voters are deeply frustrated with his handling of domestic affairs. They may be angry about the government’s concessions to the ultra-Orthodox, the burden placed on reservists (especially given the draft exemption for the ultra-Orthodox), the rising cost of living, the political dysfunction, or Netanyahu’s growing dependence on his ultra-religious coalition partners.
Yet these voters may simultaneously believe that he has been effective in restoring - or even improving - Israel’s security vis-à-vis its enemies.
That creates an unusual political calculation: “He failed on October 7, but at least he learned the lesson.”
Netanyahu’s Strongest Campaign is About “October 8”
Netanyahu does not need to convince these voters that October 7 was inevitable or that it was not his fault. His message is simple: “Israel was attacked, and we responded with unprecedented force, against all odds and while everyone else pushed to stop. We occupied half of Gaza, dismantled Hezbollah, directly attacked Iran - twice, including alongside the U.S. - and killed each and every one of the architects of October 7. Israel demonstrated that it would no longer absorb attacks without responding.”
Whether one agrees with Netanyahu’s assessment of these achievements - I personally don’t, given that all of our enemies are still standing and rearming, and given the enormous prices we paid - is a separate question. Politically, however, the argument is powerful because it speaks to a deeply held Israeli instinct: after October 7, Israel must project strength and determination.
On the civilian side of Israeli life, Netanyahu has a much more complicated record to defend: The cost of living. The failing education system. The complete lack of security inspections on flights, as exposed by the near-disaster involving the FlyDubai flight. The growing power of the ultra-Orthodox. Netanyahu tries to deflect by bringing the conversation back to security, exploiting Israelis’ concerns and fears.
And this is where the opposition leaders face a difficult problem. During the war, much of their criticism focused on its length, its costs, the government’s conduct, and the absence of a clear political strategy for what comes next.
Those are legitimate and necessary arguments. But Netanyahu can turn that criticism into an advantage: “We kept on fighting.” His opponents can then be portrayed - not fairly, but effectively - as the politicians who “wanted to stop,” who “caved in before the world,” and who are guilty of a sin worse than any intelligence failure: weakness.
And this is why, in my opinion, Netanyahu benefits from the discourse over October 7.
Netanyahu’s Weakness is in Bnei Brak, not Be'eri
On the civilian side of Israeli life - especially vis-à-vis the ultra-Orthodox - Netanyahu has a much more complicated record to defend.
The constantly rising cost of living. The failing education system. The complete lack of security inspections on flights, as exposed by the near-disaster involving the FlyDubai flight. The growing power of the ultra-Orthodox, and especially the lack of equal sharing of the burden of national service and participation in the workforce.
These are areas in which Netanyahu’s political coalition is much more vulnerable. He tries to deflect by bringing the conversation back to security (his current slogan is “Yamin o Falastin,” meaning “Right or Palestine”), exploiting Israelis’ concerns and fears, and our desire to feel not just safe, but powerful.
Let me be clear: October 7 remains an enormous liability for Netanyahu. There are Israelis for whom no subsequent military achievement can erase the fact that the country was invaded, that 251 people were kidnapped, and that more than 1,100 Israelis were murdered on his watch. There are others who believe the political and security system he built over many years directly contributed to the conditions that made the disaster possible. Many are not satisfied with the outcomes of the war, no matter how many October 7 architects we killed. And there are Israelis who simply want a change after so many years of Netanyahu’s leadership.
But the electorate does not consist only of them.
The Opposition Must Find a Better Campaign
The more interesting question is what happens to voters who are dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s domestic record, who blame him for October 7, who are exhausted by the political crisis, and who really want a different government.
But then they look at the opposition and ask - and it would be unwise to dismiss that question - whether Bennett, Lieberman, Eisenkot, and Golan would have done the same.
If the opposition’s answer is primarily about replacing Netanyahu, repairing Israeli democracy, and drafting ultra-Orthodox - as desirable as those outcomes may be - it might not be enough for a country facing real security threats.
Hence, paradoxically, talking about October 7 might be moving the campaign onto Netanyahu’s strongest terrain.
The opposition therefore needs to make a more sophisticated argument. Had I been advising them, I’d have told them to focus on the domestic failures - especially caving in to the ultra-Orthodox, which is the issue that former Netanyahu allies are most angry about - and leave the security issue aside.
Let the memories of October 7 speak for themselves.
October 7 should not be forgotten - it cannot. The responsibility for it will not disappear beneath the achievements of the war. But if Israel’s next election becomes primarily a referendum on who can fight its enemies most forcefully and stand the internal and external pressure, the opposition might not like what Israelis think.
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