Three Years Have Passed. This Time, We Have Two Conceptions.
- 4 days ago
- 7 min read
(by Rotem Oreg-Kalisky, founder of LIBRAEL)
I recently finished reading 06:29 by Amos Harel of Haaretz, a deeply unsettling account of the failures that preceded October 7. There is much I could say about Harel’s revelations, both as an Israeli citizen and as a reserve intelligence analyst. But one point in particular stayed with me: how the Israeli system became trapped in a Conception - that “Hamas does not want war.”

The warning signs were there. Female observers reported seeing more developed and more intense Hamas exercises. Junior intelligence personnel, including the NCO known as V., raised the alarm that Hamas was taking its plans to breach the wall, kidnap Israelis, and kill civilians very seriously. Former senior IDF officers made it clear that over-reliance on the wall and technological defense solutions would eventually fail. Yet the system could not challenge the assumptions through which it interpreted reality.
Three years later, we risk repeating the same mistake - this time in the American arena.
In its cognitive meaning (unlike the biological one), a Conception is a collection of beliefs and statements that we accept as self-evident, and through which we judge reality. We all have them. They are part of the limitations of being human. What matters is recognizing them, and being willing to challenge them.
When it comes to the U.S.-Israel relations, we believe we are currently trapped between two competing conceptions, each held by a different side of the aisle in Israeli politics. Both are detached from reality in ways that should concern us. And both risk leaving Israel unprepared for the America that is emerging before our eyes.
Even President Trump - who has demonstrated a degree of personal affinity for Israel - has shown that this sentiment will not prevent him from pursuing his foreign-policy priorities
There is no longer any serious way to deny that the U.S.-Israel relations are experiencing a crisis. Poll after poll has documented declining support for Israel among more and more parts of the American public. Politicians and influencers on both the left and right compete to see who can be more critical of Israel. Even President Trump - who has demonstrated a degree of personal affinity for Israel - has shown that this sentiment will not prevent him from pursuing his foreign-policy priorities when he believes they require it, even if it means jeopardizing Israel’s core interests, such as prioritizing the opening of the Strait of Hormuz over ensuring that Iran does not achieve nuclear capabilities.
So what do we do? How do we get out of the crisis?
We have badly damaged our relationship with Democrats - this is why LIBRAEL was founded, to rebuild that relationship. Meanwhile, Republicans are not immune to the same forces: within parts of the MAGA movement, as well as among younger evangelicals, support for Israel is becoming less automatic. Some are gradually coming to believe that the progressive left was right all along: that Israel and America no longer share fundamental values - and perhaps do not even share enough interests to justify the relationship.
Conception No. 1: Interests Are Enough
One response is to accept the crisis as a fact of life, the product of forces beyond our control, and to internalize the decline in the “shared values” component of the relationship.
Instead, its proponents argue, Israel should maintain its alliance with America - and with other countries - on the basis of shared interests alone.

The solution, widely held by the current Israeli government, is straightforward: Israel must become so strong - militarily, economically, technologically, and strategically - that America simply cannot afford to ignore or abandon it.
Antisemitism will always exist. International institutions will always be biased against us. But Israel’s strategic value, the argument goes, will always be too great to walk away from.
On paper, this sounds compelling. We all want Israel to be as strong, innovative, and strategically important as possible. Cooperation is good. There is just one problem: it is not enough.
Look at Ukraine: over the past four years, Ukraine has inflicted enormous damage on the Russian military without a single American soldier being killed in the process. Few countries have advanced American strategic interests, in Europe and at large, more directly than Ukraine.
And yet this did not prevent significant parts of the Republican Party from portraying Ukraine as ungrateful, corrupt, or manipulative; from placing Ukraine and Russia on equal footing; or from legitimizing some of Vladimir Putin’s demands.
A relationship based solely on interests may work with authoritarian states, such as our neighbors in the Middle East. But America is a democracy, and democracies need something deeper than transactional calculations to sustain a durable alliance. Shared interests matter. But shared values matter, too.
Conception No. 2: Just Change the Israeli Government
The second Conception takes the opposite approach.
It sees the crisis primarily as a “product problem.” Israel, according to this view, has a problem with its product: its government, the policies it leads, and the person in charge, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who became a toxic figure among wide audiences in America.
The solution is therefore simple. Israel needs to “elect a normal government,” return to constructive policies toward the Palestinians, and the crisis will largely resolve itself.

There is certainly truth in the argument that Israeli policy matters. Governments make choices, and those choices have consequences. In the past decade, and particularly since October 7, Israel has openly abandoned any commitment it had to at least trying to reach peace with the Palestinians.
A change in leadership is probably a necessary step, but far from sufficient. Believing that changing the government will, by itself, restore the old relationship is another Conception. It fundamentally underestimates the profound changes American and Israeli societies have undergone over the past several decades.
The United States has grown deeply weary of war in general and of the Middle East in particular. That experience has produced growing skepticism toward arguments based on “security needs” - just as the Second Intifada, repeated rounds of violence, and October 7 have produced deep skepticism in Israel toward “peace processes.”
Older generations, who remember Israel as “the David of the Middle East” are gradually giving way to younger Americans whose relationship with Israel was formed under very different circumstances, in which Israel is more of a Goliath in the Middle East - rich, powerful, and often aggressive - than David.
American politics has also become increasingly focused on domestic challenges. Both MAGA and the Woke movements have transformed the political landscape, each in its own way challenging elements of the traditional American political consensus, and much of what it has in common with the Israeli ethos of pioneering, a nation of immigrants, and a safe haven for the Jewish people.
Demographic changes matter, too. American society is changing generationally. Older generations, particularly older Jewish Americans, who remember Israel as “the David of the Middle East” are gradually giving way to younger Americans whose relationship with Israel was formed under very different circumstances, in which Israel is more of a Goliath in the Middle East - powerful, rich, and often aggressive - than David. The American Jewish community itself has undergone profound changes.
And above all, polarization, populism, and political extremism are eating away at the shared assumptions that once made American foreign policy - and American alliances - more stable.
The idea, widely held by the Israeli opposition, that we can simply turn the clock back “if only” Israel changes its government is therefore simplistic, if not outright childish. As Dorothy might have put it, right after arriving in the Land of Oz: we're not in Kansas anymore.
If you liked our work, that means you share our vision and values. You can help us live up to the urgent task we’ve taken upon ourselves by donating to LIBRAEL.
We Need a New Paradigm
Israel needs a new way of thinking about the United States, and about our unique, irreplaceable, relationship with it. Thankfully, people are starting to realize that “putting all our eggs” in the Republican basket is a failed strategy, but there is still a question of what comes next.
That paradigm cannot place all its faith in shared interests. It also cannot sell itself the illusion that one election, one policy shift, or one change of government will magically restore the relationship we once knew.
The answer is not to choose between interests and values. It is to understand that a sustainable alliance requires both - and that the meaning of those interests and values is changing not just on both sides of the relationship, but on both sides of the aisle in American politics.

This is precisely why Israel needs to invest not only in military strength, technology, and strategic partnerships, and to understand which partnerships are of value to each side of the aisle, but also in the political and ideological foundations of the relationship.
We would love to see a real debate between a coalition MK and an opposition MK about the future of the U.S.-Israel relations: What kind of relationship should Israel seek?
We at LIBRAEL are rebuilding a compelling liberal Zionist vision that can speak to Americans who are still open to Israel, but struggle to understand how Israel fits into their own values and worldview.
That means listening as much as making our case. Above all, it means recognizing that the relationship cannot survive on autopilot.
Unfortunately, as with so many other critical issues facing Israel, there is very little serious public debate about this - not least in the political arena. We would love to see a real debate between a coalition MK and an opposition MK about the future of the U.S.-Israel relations: What kind of relationship should Israel seek? What are the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches? What can realistically be achieved? And what should Israel be willing to change - and what should it never compromise?
Maybe that is how we finally break out of the Conception, and this time, hopefully, before 6:29.



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