The Turkish Challenge Could Open a Door for Israel That Is Nearly Closed in Washington

By Rotem Oreg-Kalisky, LIBRAEL's founder; all views are his; Originally published in Maariv

Three years of war on seven fronts have deepened Israelis tendency to think about the Middle East in binary terms: allies versus enemies. But Erdoğan’s Türkiye does not fit neatly into either category.

Erdoğan is hardly a friend of Israel, and he is transforming Türkiye into a regional power. Türkiye's growing influence in Africa, the Mediterranean, The Red Sea, and the Middle East - including the nuclear umbrella it has received from Pakistan - is strengthening its position on the global stage. Its involvement in building up Syria’s military capabilities, along with its ambition to play a major role in shaping the day after in Gaza, presents Israel with a genuine strategic challenge.

Trump has cultivated a close personal relationship with Erdoğan for years, and there is little reason to assume that the White House will want to pursue a tough line toward Ankara.

But Türkiye is not Iran. It is a member of NATO, has the alliance’s second-largest military, and maintains a deep relationship with the United States. The idea that the Turkish challenge can be addressed through military deterrence alone misses a large part of the picture. Israel must prepare militarily for the possibility of a confrontation with Ankara - but at the same time, it should work to contain Türkiye through diplomacy.

And this is where an opportunity lies that Israel is barely exploiting: the Turkish threat could become the basis for a new shared interest with the Democratic Party in the United States.

In recent years, Israel has steadily distanced itself from the Democratic Party, while investing most of its political capital in President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. Yet Trump has cultivated a close personal relationship with Erdoğan for years, and there is little reason to assume that the White House will want to pursue a tough line toward Ankara.

Among Democrats, by contrast, attitudes toward the Turkish president are far more skeptical, given his sustained assault on press freedom, persecution of political opponents, weakening of the judiciary, and erosion of Turkish democracy. These policies have made Erdoğan a deeply controversial figure across significant parts of the Democratic Party.

In Syria, Israel can and should work with Washington to establish clear red lines that prevent the kind of Turkish military entrenchment that could pose a direct threat to Israel.

In conversations I have had with senior Democratic figures in Washington, it is clear that there is also growing concern about Türkiye's expanding regional influence - particularly the possibility that Türkiye could become a dominant player in Gaza. Ankara’s longstanding ties with Hamas and Erdoğan’s intense hostility toward Israel make a significant Turkish presence in the Gaza Strip a security risk for Israel. From a Democratic perspective, however, the concern is broader: the risk of introducing yet another power pursuing its own agenda into an arena that is already struggling to achieve stability.

This is precisely where an opportunity lies for Jerusalem.

For decades, the relationship between Israel and the Democratic Party rested not only on shared security interests, but also on a genuine sense of shared values: the rule of law, independent institutions, freedom of expression, and human rights. Confronted with Erdoğan, who has become a symbol of democratic backsliding in favor of increasingly personalized authoritarian rule, there is once again an opportunity for Israel’s interests and the Democratic Party’s values-based worldview to meet.

The Turkish challenge could become an opportunity to rebuild something Israel has lost in Washington: a relationship with the Democratic Party based not just on shared interests but on shared democratic values.

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Instead of arriving in Washington with a list of requests for support for Israeli positions, Jerusalem should propose a shared policy agenda: limiting Turkish influence in Syria and Gaza while strengthening regional actors who have an interest in stability, such as Egypt, the UAE, and a reformed PA.

In Gaza, for example, Israel needs to stop defining the future primarily by whom we do not want to see there and start offering an alternative. That means building partnerships with Arab states that have no interest in strengthening Hamas or turning Gaza into a hub of Turkish influence. In Syria, Israel can and should work with Washington to establish clear red lines that prevent the kind of Turkish military entrenchment that could pose a direct threat to Israel.

It is time to stop waiting for the Democratic Party to “come back to supporting Israel” and start rebuilding the foundations of a partnership with it based on what Democrats care about.

If Jerusalem plays its cards correctly, the Turkish challenge could become more than a threat to contain. It could become an opportunity to rebuild something Israel has lost in Washington: a relationship with the Democratic Party based not just on shared interests but on shared democratic values.